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By Susan J. Willenborg
Labor Relations Issues in the Public Sector Electronic
Workplace
I. Introduction
In recent years, the public sector
workplace has become increasingly
computerized. For example, Niles
Township High School District No.
219 is gradually becoming paperless.1
"All material is stored on the web, and
every computer is connected to the
[district's internal] intranet."2 Conse-
quently, "[t]here are twenty-seven
positions in the District's Technology
Department."3  As computers have
proliferated, e-mail has become an
important means of communication,4
and new positions have been created
devoted to technological matters.
These developments raise ques-
tions as to how labor relations issues
should be managed in this new,
increasingly computerized setting.
This article will discuss the case law
concerning three such issues: 1)
technology personnel as confidential
employees, 2) restrictions on union
access to e-mail and 3) computer use
policies as a subject of bargaining.
As the public educational workplace
has become computerized, a practice
has developed among employers'
administrators to store labor relations
information on their workstation hard
drives or the employer's computer
network and to communicate concern-
ing labor relations matters via e-
mail.5  This has raised the issue of
whether technology personnel are
"confidential employees" based on
their actual or potential exposure to
that labor relations information.
Both the Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Act ("IELRA") and the
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act
("IPLRA") exclude "confidential em-
ployees" from the definition of
employees who are covered by those
acts.6  The definition of "confidential
employee" in the two statutes is
similar.  Section 2(n) of the IELRA7
defines "confidential employee" as
an employee, who (i) in the regular
course of his or her duties, assists
and acts in a confidential capacity
to persons who formulate, deter-
mine and effectuate management
policies with regard to labor
relations or who (ii) in the regular
course of his or her duties has
access to information relating to
the effectuation or review of the
employer's collective bargaining
policies.
Section 3(c) of the IPLRA8 defines
"confidential employee" as
an employee who, in the regular
course of his or her duties, assists
and acts in a confidential capacity
to persons who formulate, deter-
mine, and effectuate management
policies with regard to labor
relations or who, in the regular
course of his or her duties, has
authorized access to information
relating to the effectuation or
review of the employer's collective
bargaining policies.
The seminal case in the Illinois public
sector considering whether technology
personnel should be classified as
"confidential employees" and excluded
from statutory protection is Woodland
Community Unit School District.9  In
Woodland, the Illinois Educational
Labor Relations Board, with Chair-
man Gerald Berendt and Member
Michael Gavin dissenting, determined
that a Technology Coordinator was a
confidential employee under the
second, "access," prong of the defini-
tion. The IELRB found that the
Technology Coordinator had authority
to access and repair the employer's
computers, back-up system, and all
computer files, including those of the
superintendent, to "make sure [the
files] have not been corrupted."10 The
Board further found that the Technol-
ogy Coordinator's access to all files was
a prerequisite to performing necessary
maintenance and repair functions.11
Once a file was displayed on a
computer screen, it would almost
invariably be read.12 Moreover, the
Technology Coordinator was the sole
employee responsible for assigning
and maintaining all network user
names and passwords.13
The IELRB also found that the
Technology Coordinator's job descrip-
tion clearly contemplated that she
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would have access to confidential
collective bargaining information.14
The job description provided that one of
the Technology Coordinator's "essen-
tial duties and responsibilities" was to
maintain strict confidentiality with
respect to "information relating to . . .
the effectuation or review of the
District's collective bargaining poli-
cies."15
Chairman Berendt and Member
Gavin dissented.  They argued that
although the Technology Coordinator
was responsible for the system that
provided security and confidentiality,
her job description did not afford her
routine access to confidential informa-
tion concerning collective bargaining
policies.16  The IELRB's decision in
Woodland was affirmed by the Illinois
Appellate Court in an unpublished
order.
The IELRB next considered whether
technology personnel were confiden-
tial in Lake County Area Vocational
System.17 The positions at issue in




cians").18 The Technicians were
"responsible for the operation and
maintenance of the employer's com-
puter network."19 The IELRB found
that the Technicians "ha[d] access to
each employee's username and net-
work password and determine[d] the
level of security access each employee
[would] have to the [e]mployer's
network."20  The Board further found
that "the Technicians [could] access
any employee's computer workstation
and any of the files the employee ha[d]
saved to the workstation hard drive or
to the [e]mployer's network."21  More-
over, "the Technicians' job responsi-
bilities include[d] routinely monitor-
ing all of the employees' use of the
[e]mployer's network."22
The IELRB did not decide in Lake
County whether the disputed Techni-
cians were confidential employees, but
remanded the case for an evidentiary
hearing.  In so doing, it set forth a test
to be applied in cases concerning the
confidential status of technology
employees:
When deciding Unit Clarification
petitions involving employees who
are responsible for the operation
and maintenance of an educational
employer's computer system, we
will consider, but are not limited to
considering, the following factors:
1) whether there is evidence of
actual access to confidential
collective bargaining information
in the regular course of duties; 2)
job description, and 3) the
employee's day-to-day activities.23
The IELRB further held that,
"where access to confidential informa-
tion is merely incidental to an
employee's primary duties, such as
[where] a custodian empties a
superintendent's wastebasket," that
employee is not confidential.24  More-
over, where a position is well
established temporally, the IELRB
would weigh heavily "evidence of
actual access to confidential labor
relations material as part of the
employee's job," since even "sporadic"
performance of confidential duties can
render an employee's status confiden-
tial if it is part of the regular course of
employee’s duties.25 The IELRB also
noted that it would closely scrutinize
cases where multiple technicians
handle confidential information.26
Because the unit clarification petition
involved in Lake County was with-
drawn on April 16, 2004, there is no
IELRB decision finally adjudicating
the confidential status of the Techni-
cians.
In Support Council of District 39
v. IELRB,27 the IELRB Executive
Director issued a Recommended
Decision and Order finding that a
computer network manager was a
confidential employee and, accord-
ingly, denying the union's unit
clarification petition seeking to add
the position to the bargaining unit.28
On review by the IELRB, there was no
majority. Therefore, the IELRB issued
an order providing that the Executive
Director's Order was the final order of
the agency but did not have
precedential effect.
On review, the Illinois Appellate
Court determined that the computer
network manager was a confidential
employee.29  The court found that the
computer network manager had full
access to the employer's computer
system and "engaged in routine
monitoring of network use by
employees."30   The court noted that the
computer network manager retrieved
lost data and "engaged in district-wide
repair and maintenance of computer
network systems.  The court found
that the computer network manager
"sees, manipulates, reads and develops
reports from all data on all district
computers, including confidential
material pertaining to labor rela-
tions."31 The court found that the
regular duties of the position included
providing assistance on the network in
a confidential capacity to the employer's
top administrators.32 The court con-
cluded that the computer network
manager was a confidential employee
under both prongs, labor nexus and
3
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access, of the statutory definition.
In Glenview Community Consoli-
dated School District No. 34,33  the
IELRB considered whether the Ad-
ministrative Assistant to the Director
of Technology was a confidential
employee.  The IELRB found that the
administrative assistant provided
day-to-day technology support for the
employer's administrative office, in-
cluding first level troubleshooting, but
that a large portion of her duties were
administrative.34 The IELRB deter-
mined that close scrutiny was
warranted because of the number of
technology employees.35   In contrast to
the technology coordinator in Wood-
land, the employer failed to demon-
strate that the administrative assis-
tant accessed all files to maintain the
computer system and ensure that it
was operating properly.36  The evi-
dence established only that the
administrative assistant gave other
employees access to the employer's
computer system, although docu-
ments that she might encounter while
troubleshooting, retrieving or repair-
ing them could include labor relations
documents.37   The IELRB noted that
the employer's former Executive
Director of Human Resources had
admitted that she had not shown the
administrative assistant or the former
network technician, whose position
was incorporated into the administra-
tive assistant's position, any labor
relations documents.38  The IELRB
stated that it required that "real and
more than incidental access will occur
in the regular course of [the
employee's] duties.”39 The IELRB
concluded that the administrative
assistant was not a confidential
employee.
The Appellate Court affirmed the
IELRB's decision.40   The court stated
that although theoretically the admin-
istrative assistant could have access to
confidential collective bargaining in-
formation, there was no evidence
showing that the administrative
assistant had "actual authorized,
unfettered access to confidential
collective bargaining information" in
the regular course of her duties.41
Additionally, the administrative
assistant's day-to-day activities pri-
marily involved general administra-
tive duties.  The court determined that
the IELRB did not act arbitrarily in
applying greater scrutiny due to the
number of technicians.42
Most recently, in Niles Township
High School District No. 219,43   this
author, sitting as Administrative Law
Judge, considered whether a Systems
and Networking Engineer, a Senior
Programmer/Analyst and a WWW
Communications Assistant were con-
fidential employees.  The Systems and
Networking Engineer was the admin-
istrator of the employer's network.  He
managed the employer's servers and
the access to those servers, assisted in
storing information on the network,
repaired and maintained the network,
retrieved or restored confidential data
on the network, and was responsible
for the e-mail system.44  The Senior
Programmer/Analyst kept track of all
of the employer's financial and student
databases and services; developed
databases; and performed web develop-
ment, installation and upgrades of
programs and analytical functions.45
The WWW Communications   A s s i s-
tant's duties included "developing,
implementing, troubleshooting and
supporting all the [employer's] inter-
nal and external web sites, as well as
any related databases."46    She assisted
in repairing, restoring and maintain-
ing the web, and backed up and
restored data.47
The ALJ concluded that none of
these employees were confidential
employees under the first, labor nexus,
prong of the statutory definition.  The
ALJ stated that gathering information
is insufficient to establish confidential
status, and that information concern-
ing grievances is not the type of
information protected by Section 2(n)
of the IELRA.48  Although the Director
of Technology had asked the employees
to restore data, the ALJ found no
indication that they were given access
to how the data was to be used,49 and
that the employees had been asked to
investigate improper computer use
related only to general business or
disciplinary matters, which was
insufficient to establish confidential
status.50
The ALJ also concluded that the
Systems and Networking Engineer
was  not a confidential employee under
the second, access, prong of the
statutory definition. Key to the
Administrative Law Judge's conclu-
sion was the Systems and Networking
Engineer's testimony that he had not
read information concerning negotia-
tions unless he was told to do so, and
that during his six years of
employment in the position he had not
been told to do so.51
Similarly, the ALJ concluded that
the WWW Communications Assistant
was not a confidential employee under
the access prong. The ALJ relied on
the WWWCommunications Assistant's
testimony that she had not "read
confidential information on pass-word
protected sites concerning meeting
minutes, negotiations, grievances or
bargaining unit related materials," or
any of the Assistant Superintendent
for Human Resources' documents.52
Further, in her five years of
employment in that position, the
WWW Communications Assistant did
not remember coming across any
documents related to negotiations or
grievances and she would not have
reason to read a document from the
employer concerning what it was
willing to offer in negotiations.53
The ALJ noted that the job
description for the WWW Communi-
cations Assistant contained the
following language: "Develops, main-
tains and supports District internet
and intranet, including information
relating to the effectuation or review of
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District 219's bargaining policies."54
However, in light of the WWW
Communications Assistant's testi-
mony that she had not read
confidential information concerning
negotiations, the ALJ construed this
job description as providing only that
the WWW Communications Assistant
"develops, maintains and supports
sites containing information related to
negotiations, and not that her duties
require her to read such informa-
tion."55
However, the ALJ concluded that
the Senior Programmer/Analyst was a
confidential employee under the access
prong. The ALJ found that the Senior
Programmer/Analyst was asked to
prepare reports for negotiations,
which could include spreadsheets
stating the cost of giving a specified
amount in negotiations.  The ALJ
determined that this duty gave the
Senior Programmer/Analyst access
not only to the underlying informa-
tion, but also to what amounts the
employer was considering offering.56
The  IELRB affirmed the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's decision in its
entirety.57   The employer has appealed
the case to the Appellate Court.
After creating an exclusion for
technological personnel in Woodland,
the IELRB has progressively nar-
rowed that exclusion. Support Council
of District 39 v. IELRB,58  which held
a computer network manager to be a
confidential employee, can be viewed
as limited to its particular facts, where
the court found that the employee
"sees, manipulates, reads and develops
reports from all data on all district
computers, including confidential
material pertaining to labor rela-
tions."59  This trend is consistent with
Illinois court decisions stating that the
confidential exclusion is narrowly
interpreted because classifying an
employee as confidential precludes
him or her from exercising the panoply
of rights set forth in the IELRA.60 The
purpose of the IELRA is to "promote
orderly and constructive relationships
between all educational employees and
their employer," and the General
Assembly has determined that the
overall policy may best be accom-
plished by "granting to educational
employees the right to organize and
choose freely their representatives."61
Therefore, in accordance with statu-
tory policy and decisions of the Illinois
Appellate Court, technology personnel
should not be excluded from the
protections of the IELRA as confiden-
tial employees where there are
plausible grounds for not regarding
them as confidential.
The Illinois Labor Relations Board
and its predecessors, the Illinois State
Labor Relations Board and the Illinois
Local Labor Relations Board, have not
ruled on whether technology personnel
are confidential employees within the
meaning of Section 3(c) of the IPLRA.
However, those issues have been
addressed by Administrative Law
Judges and the ILRB’s Executive
Director.62
In County of Christian,63 an
ISLRB ALJ determined that a
computer network administrator was
not a confidential employee.  The ALJ
found that there was no information on
the employer's computer network
dealing with sensitive matters arising
from the collective bargaining process.
As no exceptions were filed, the ISLRB
made the Administrative Law Judge's
non-precedential decision final and
binding on the parties.
In State of Illinois, Department of
Central Management Services (De-
partment of Corrections),64  the Acting
Executive Director of the ILRB
determined that an Information
Systems Analyst II was a confidential
employee under both prongs of the
definition in the IPLRA.  The
Information Systems Analyst II acted
in a confidential capacity to the
Bureau Manager of Personnel when he
set up databases and prepared reports,
and had access to confidential labor
relations material when he installed
and updated files on certain worksta-
tion computers.
On review, the ILRB, State Panel
found that the circumstances in which
the unit clarification procedure could
be used were not present, and
dismissed the unit clarification peti-
tion.  The Illinois Appellate Court, on
review, determined that the State
could file a unit clarification petition to
remove a confidential employee from a
bargaining unit at any time and
reversed the decision of the State
Panel.65    The court did not determine
whether the Information Systems
Analyst II was a confidential em-
ployee, but remanded to the State
Panel to make that determination.
After the case was remanded, the
petition was withdrawn, so no
precedential determination was made
concerning the confidential status of
the position.
In Rockford Housing Authority,66
an ILRB ALJ determined that a
Management Information System
Support Technician and Desktop
Support Technician were not confiden-
tial employees.  The ALJ stated that
neither employee had been given
permission to access any information
relating to labor relations, and that
their access to the employer's
confidential labor relations informa-
tion was only incidental to their
primary duties.  As no exceptions were
filed, the Illinois Labor Relations
Board, State Panel made the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's non-precedential
decision final and binding on the
parties.
The Acting Executive Director's
decision in State of Illinois, Depart-
ment of Central Management Ser-
vices (Department of Corrections)
may not be wholly consistent with case
law under the IELRA.  This decision
did not stand on review.  Otherwise,
while non-precedential, the decisions
under the IPLRA are consistent with
the decisions under the IELRA.  The
exclusion for confidential employees
should be narrowly interpreted for




III.  Restrictions on Union
Access to E-Mail
In light of the reality that e-mail has
become an important means of
communication in the public sector
workplace, employers have adopted
policies concerning e-mail use, which
may bear on union communications.
The legality of such policies has not
been tested in the Illinois public sector,
but they have been considered in other
jurisdictions, and these cases may
serve as a guide for in Illinois public
sector decisions.  The general result
has been that an employer may not
discriminatorily apply an e-mail use
policy against union communications.
However, there is some case law
finding violations on a broader basis.
In Florida Board of Education,67  the
Florida Public Employees Relations
Commission adopted the hearing's
officer's recommended order finding
that the employer's policies prohibit-
ing use of the e-mail system for union
solicitation constituted an overly
broad no-solicitation rule. The hearing
officer found that the policies con-
tained no provision for employees to
solicit fellow employees in work areas
on non-work time.  The hearing officer
stated that, for example, if a faculty
member chose to eat lunch in his or her
office, the faculty member's office
would become a non-work area during
the lunch period.
Administrative Law Judges of the
California Public Employment Rela-
tions Board have found violations
based on specific statutory language.
of the California Educational Employ-
ment Relations Act and the California
Higher Education Employer-Employee
Relations Act.  In Delano Union
Elementary School District,68  for
example, the ALJ relied Section
3543.1(b) of the California Educational
Employment Relations Act in finding a
violation. Section 3543.1(b) provides
that "employee organizations shall
have…the right to use institutional
bulletin boards, mailboxes, and other
means of communication, subject to
reasonable regulation."69 The ALJ
found that the District's unilateral
decision that a union representative
could not send union-related emails
during class time was not a
"reasonable regulation" subject to
negotiations between the district and
the union.70 In Regents of the
University of California,71  the ALJ
relied on Section 3568 of the California
Higher Education Employer-Employee
Relations Act in finding a violation.
That section provides that "subject to
reasonable regulations, employee or-
ganizations shall have…the right to
use institutional bulletin boards,
mailboxes and other means of
communication."72 The ALJ found
that such language created a pre-
sumptive right of access for employees,
which the employer could rebut by
showing that such access would be
disruptive.73
However, in the absence of specific
statutory language granting employ-
ees access to mediums of communica-
tion controlled by the employer, a
finding of a violation must rest on
some other ground, such as discrimi-
nation.  In State of California,74 for
instance, the California PERB adopted
the decision of an ALJ stating that "in
the absence of Dills Act75  language
granting employee organizations the
right to use 'other means of
communication,' PERB has no power
to create such a guaranteed right."76
The ALJ then found violations on the
grounds of discrimination.77  One
department's policy explicitly provided
that "incidental employee social
functions or public service activities
not related to union business or union
organization purposes is permit-
ted…..," a provision discriminatory on
its face.78    The ALJ also found that
three departments had committed
violations in the application of other,
more neutrally worded policies, by
prohibiting incidental and minimal
use of e-mail for union-related
messages while allowing it for other
non-business purposes.79   On the other
hand, the ALJ found that the employer
did not commit a violation by
instructing two employees to stop
using the employer's e-mail system for
regular and voluminous messages
about union business, because there
was no evidence that the employer had
permitted this volume of use for
personal purposes.80
In Oakland County, the Michigan
Employment Relations Commission
stated that, "where the employer
permits employee use of the e-mail
system for nonwork purposes, [] the
employer may not discriminatorily
prohibit employees from using the e-
mail system for union or other
protected concerted activities.”81  How-
ever, the Commission found no
discrimination in that case, stating
that there was "no absolute right for
employees or the union to use the
employer's e-mail system for either
personal or union business,"82  and
that access to an employer's e-mail
system could be compelled only "if
other types of non-business use of the
e-mail system of comparable scope
[were] knowingly permitted."83   There-
fore, the employer had not committed
a violation.
Similarly, in City of Clearwater,84
the Florida Public Employees Rela-
tions Commission stated that the
employer "has absolute control over its
email and computer systems and is
free to operate those systems as it
chooses."  However, the Commission
determined that the employer had
committed a violation by arbitrarily
and discriminatorily banning a
particular union from using the
employer's e-mail system.
Likewise, the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB") has ruled
that an employer may not
discriminatorily prohibit use of e-mail
for union business.  In E.I DuPont de
Nemours & Co.,85   the NLRB found a
violation where the employer allowed a
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wide range of personal use of e-mail
and also allowed use by employer-
dominated organizations, but prohib-
ited use by union representatives to
distribute any union literature or
notice.  And in Media General
Operations, Inc.,86   the NLRB approved
the ALJ's alternate finding that the
employer had committed a violation
where the employer informed the
union that it was prohibited from
using the employer's computer equip-
ment and e-mail system for union
business, while still permitting e-
mails of a personal nature.
In The Register-Guard,87 the NLRB
maintained its position that an
employer may not discriminatorily
prohibit use of e-mail for union
business. However, the NLRB major-
ity radically changed its standard for
what constitutes unlawful discrimina-
tion.  The NLRB majority stated:
[T]o be unlawful, discrimination
must be along Section 788  l ines.  In
other words, unlawful discrimina-
tion consists of disparate treat-
ment of activities or communica-
tions of a similar character
because of their union or other
Section 7-protected status . . . .
. . . nothing in the Act prohibits an
employer from drawing lines on a
non-Section 7 basis.  That is, an
employer may draw a line between
charitable solicitations and
noncharitable solicitations, be-
tween solicitations of a personal
nature (e.g., a car for sale) and
solicitations for the commercial
sale of a product (e.g., Avon
products), between invitations for
an organization and invitations of
a personal nature, between solici-
tations and mere talk, and
between business-related use and
nonbusiness-related use.89
The NLRB majority found that
there was no evidence that the
employer permitted employees to use
e-mail to solicit other employees to
support any group or organization.90
The majority, therefore, concluded
that the employer did not commit a
violation by warning an employee for
certain e-mails.91   On the other hand,
the majority also concluded that the
employer committed a violation by
warning an employee for an e-mail
that was not a solicitation.92  Members
Liebman and Walsh dissented from
the majority's overruling of NLRB
precedent about the meaning of
discrimination.93
In District 1199W United Profes-
sionals for Quality Health Care v.
University of Wisconsin Hospitals &
Clinics Authority,94 in contrast, the
Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission employed a balancing
test.  The Commission found that, by
blocking the union's access to the
employer's e-mail system, the em-
ployer interfered with employee
rights.95  The Commission also found
that the legitimacy of the employer's
interests was belied by the selective
nature of its action.  The Commission
concluded that the employer commit-
ted a violation by blocking the union's
access to its e-mail system.96
The principle that a public
employer can, in the absence of special
circumstances, prohibit use of e-mail
for non-work purposes, but cannot
discriminate against union-related
messages if it allows other non-work-
related messages, is the proper
analysis.  This analysis allows for a
public employer to exercise legitimate
authority and for public resources to
be devoted to public purposes, but also
allows for public employees to exercise
their statutory right to engage in
union activity.  The standard for
determining what is discrimination
stated by the majority in The Register-
Guard, however, is not the proper
analysis.  Where an employer allows
use of e-mail for any non-work
purposes, the prohibition of union-
related messages is inherently a
violation of the employees' statutory
right to engage in union activity.  The
employer, however, may limit use of e-
mail for union-related messages to a
comparable scope as it permits for
other non-work messages-for example,
if an employer allows only incidental
use of e-mail for other non-work
purposes, it may not be compelled to
permit voluminous and frequent
union-related e-mail. In addition, some
union-related messages are not prop-
erly non-work messages, such as
communications to the employer
about grievances.  Such e-mails should
be permitted even if the employer does
not allow non-work use of e-mail.
IV.  Computer Use Policies
as a Subject of Bargaining
The issue of whether computer use
policies are a mandatory subject of
bargaining has not been resolved in
the Illinois public sector.  In other
jurisdictions, there is conflicting case
law. In California Newspapers Part-
nership d/b/a ANG Newpapers,97  the
NLRB affirmed the Administrative
Law Judge's finding that the employer
had committed a violation by unilater-
ally implementing a revised e-mail
policy.  The ALJ  stated that "[t]here is
no dispute that a rule respecting
employee use of the employer's e-mail
system, like a rule respecting
employee use of employer telephones,
is a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing."98 Similarly, in University of
Wisconsin Hospitals & Clinics Au-
thority, discussed above, the WERC
found that allowing the union this
mechanism for quick and efficient
communication with the employer
was a condition of employment.99  The
Commission determined that the
employer's unilateral decision to
terminate the practice of allowing the
union to use the employer's e-mail
system was an unfair labor practice.100
However, other jurisdictions have
come to a different conclusion.  In
Parma Heights Firefighters v. City of
Parma Heights Fire Department,101
the Ohio State Employment Relations
Board concluded that the employer's
"right to manage in the area of using
7
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would use the employer's computers
and could make concessions, such as a
prohibition against improper use.  If
benefits like this outweigh the burden
on employers, computer use policies
will be a mandatory bargaining
subject in Illinois.
V.  Conclusion
This article has dealt with some of the
labor relations issues raised by the
increasingly computerized electronic
workplace that have been or may be
faced by the IELRB and the ILRB.
While the context may be new, the
issues are similar to those that have
been faced in a less technological
context.  This article concludes that
technology personnel should not be
excluded from the protections of the
IELRA and IPLRA as confidential
employees where there are plausible
grounds for not regarding them as
confidential.  It concludes that a public
employer may, in the absence of
special circumstances, prohibit use of
e-mail for non-work purposes, but may
not discriminate against union-
related messages if it allows other non-
work-related messages.  It also
concludes that computer use policies
may be a mandatory subject of
bargaining under the IELRA and the
IPLRA.
1. Niles Township High Sch. Dist. No.
219, 23 PERI   146, (IELRB ALJ, 2007),




4. As National Labor Relations Board
Members Liebman and Walsh noted, "[e]-
mail has dramatically changed, and is con-
tinuing to change, how people communi-
cate at work," The Register-Guard, 351
NLRB No. 70 (Dec. 16, 2007) at 16 (Mem-
bers Liebman and Walsh, dissenting in
part) (slip opinion).
5. See e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Glenview Cmty.
Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 34 v. IELRB, 374
Ill. App. 3d 892, 894-95, 874 N.E.2d 158,
161 (4th Dist. 2007); Support Council of
Dist. 39 v. IELRB, 366 Ill. App. 3d 830,
the [employer's] computers for per-
sonal interests outweighs any mate-
rial effect on terms and conditions of
employment."  In California Faculty
Ass'n v. Trustees of California State
University,102 the California PERB
stated:
The decision to implement a
computer resource policy is a
managerial prerogative and, there-
fore, not negotiable.  Specifically,
AUPs103  are necessary for [the
employer] to provide its educa-
tional mission. "Computing re-
sources support virtually every
facet of [the employer's] opera-
tions, including student admis-
sions, registration, advisement,
instruction, health care services,
library services, research, com-
munications, fund-raising, busi-
ness and finance, plant operations,
human resources, and public
safety."  It is no secret that
computer networks are constantly
under attack from viruses and
worms which have the potential to
take down an entire computer
network thereby preventing [the
employer] from providing its
educational mission.  As a result, it
is necessary, if not mandatory, for
[the employer] to have a policy to
not only prevent misuse, but to be
able to react quickly to problems.
Additionally, it is necessary to
have a uniform policy for all
users.104
However, the Board also stated that
the employer had the duty to negotiate
the effects of the decision to implement
a computer use policy on bargaining
unit members if it impacted matters
within the scope of representation,
such as discipline and union access
rights.105
In the Illinois public sector,
whether computer use policies are a
mandatory subject of bargaining is to
be determined under the test set forth
in Central City Education Ass'n v.
IELRB.106  In Central City, the Illinois
Supreme Court described the test as
follows:
The first part of the test requires a
determination of whether the
matter is one of wages, hours and
terms and conditions of employ-
ment. . .  If the answer to this
question is no, the inquiry ends
and the employer is under no duty
to bargain.
If the answer to the first question is
yes, then the second question is
asked: Is the matter also one of
inherent managerial authority?  If
the answer to the second question
is no, then the analysis stops and
the matter is a mandatory subject
of bargaining.  If the answer is yes,
then the hybrid situation dis-
cussed in section 4 exists: the
matter is within the inherent
managerial authority of the
employer and it also affects wages,
hours and terms and conditions of
employment.
At this point in this analysis, the
IELRB should balance the benefits
that bargaining will have on the
decisionmaking process with the
burdens that bargaining imposes
on the employer's authority.107
Under this test, computer use
policies may be a mandatory subject of
bargaining.  Computer use policies
may be a matter of wages, hours and
terms and conditions of employment
under an analogy to parking, which
was found to be a term or condition of
employment in Board of Trustees of
University of Illinois v. ILRB,108  and
in-plant food prices and services,
which were found to be terms and
conditions of employment in Ford
Motor Co. v. NLRB.109  However,
under the second step in the analysis,
computer use policies may also be
matters of inherent managerial
authority under a rationale such as
that stated by the California Public
Employment Relations Board in
Trustees of California State Univer-
sity, discussed above.  Thus, computer
use policies would be a hybrid
situation, and Illinois courts would
enter a balancing test according to the
Central City analysis.  On one side,
bargaining over computer use policies
may have benefits to the decision-
making process.  Unions could offer
information about how employees
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Recent Developments is a regular
feature of The Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent
legal developments of interest to the
public employment relations commu-
nity. This issue focuses on develop-
ments under the two collective bar-




In Niles Township High School
District No. 219, Case No. 2003-UC-
0007-C (IELRB 2008), the IELRB
determined whether three informa-
tion technology positions in the
district were "confidential" under the
IELRA. The Board affirmed the
administrative law judge's recom-
mended order (23 PERI  ¶  146), which
found that the district's Systems and
Network Engineer and WWW Com-
munications Assistant were not
confidential and that the district's
Senior Programmer/Analyst was a
confidential employee under Section
2(n)(ii) of the IELRA, but not under
Section 2(n)(i).
On May 30, 2003, the district filed a
unit clarification petition seeking to
exclude the abovementioned positions
from the support staff bargaining unit
represented by the Niles Township
Support Staff, Local 1274.  Thereafter,
the Chief ALJ dismissed the petition as
untimely, the Board affirmed, and the
Illinois Appellate Court reversed and
remanded for a hearing, the result of
which gave rise to the instant appeal.
The Systems and Networking Engi-
neer served as the district's network
administrator in charge the mainte-
nance and repair of the district's
servers, network, and e-mail system.
Incidental to these responsibilities
was access to server data and e-mail
communications. The Senior Pro-
grammer/Analyst developed and main-
tained all of the district's financial and
student databases and services and
prepared reports to be used on
collective bargaining. The WWW
Communications Assistant's duties in-
cluded developing, implementing,
troubleshooting, repairing, and sup-
porting the district's internal intranet
and external web sites, as well as any
related databases.  She also backed up
and restored data for the district.
The ALJ held and the Board agreed
that none of the positions were
confidential under Section 2(n)(i)
covering employees whose duties
entail "assist[ing] and act[ing] in a
confidential capacity to persons who
formulate, determine and effectuate
management policies with regard to
labor relations."  The ALJ found that
none of the positions entailed actual
review of confidential labor relations
documents or other direct assistance
to members of the district's collective
bargaining team.  Applying the factors
from Board of Control of Lake County
Area Vocational System, 20 PERI ¶   5
(IELRB 2004), the ALJ held that under
the Section 2(n)(ii), the second prong of
the IELRA's confidential employee
test, neither the Systems and Network
Engineer nor the WWW Communica-
tions Assistant was confidential.
These factors included:  "1) whether
there is evidence of actual access to
confidential collective bargaining in-
formation in the regular course of
duties; 2) job description; and 3) the
employee's day-to-day activities."
The Systems and Network Engi-
neer never actually read information
concerning negotiations during his
six-year tenure and would not read it
unless directed to do so.  Similarly, the
WWW Communications Assistant
had not read any confidential
information on password protected
sites containing meeting minutes,
negotiations, grievances or bargaining
unit related materials, or any of the
Assistant Superintendent for Human
Resources' documents during her five-
year tenure.  In addition, she did not
recall coming across any documents
related to negotiations or grievances
and stated that she would have no
reason to read a document concerning
what the district was willing to offer in
labor negotiations.  Additionally, there
were other employees who performed
troubleshooting similar to the commu-
nications assistant, including those
who were not in the bargaining unit.
The ALJ did find that the Senior
Programmer/Analyst was a confiden-
tial employee under Section 2(n)(ii) of
the IELRA because that person was
asked to prepare reports for negotia-
tions, such as spreadsheets stating the
cost of giving a specified amount in
negotiations, as part of her usual day-
to-day activities.  This duty provided
actual access to confidential labor
relations information.  Further, the
analyst's job description included
"[d]evelop[ing] reports for Administra-
tion to use in collective bargaining," a
function deserving of confidential
status.  Taken together, these facts
described a confidential employee as




In City of Washington v. ILRB, 184
L.R.R.M. 2744, 2008 WL 2609715 (Ill.
App. 3d Dist. 2008), the Third District
Appellate Court affirmed a final order
of the ILRB State Panel which
included four division supervisors of
the city's public services department
in the bargaining unit.  The court
affirmed the State Panel's finding that
the duties of the water treatment
division supervisor and the supervisor
of the water and sewer maintenance
crew were not obviously and visibly
different from their subordinate
Confidential Employees
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tions were based on seniority.
Similarly, although the telecommuni-
cations supervisors were responsible
for calling employees in on overtime
and for scheduling vacations, the
decision to call employees on overtime
was based on whether the call center
would otherwise drop below its
mandated minimum coverage and
who to call was based on seniority.
Vacation scheduling was also based on
seniority.  Consequently, the court
concluded that the employer failed to
prove that the telecommunications
supervisors exercised independent
judgment in performing supervisory
duties.
In Policemen's Benevolent Labor
Committee v. County of Cook, Case
No. L-RC-07-002 (ILRB Local Panel
2008), a split Local Panel reversed the
ALJ's recommendation that lieuten-
ants, jointly employed by the County of
Cook and the Sheriff of Cook County,
fell within the coverage of the IPLRA.
The employers opposed a union
certification petition, asserting that
lieutenants were excluded as supervi-
sors. The ALJ determined that the
lieutenants were "public employees"
rather than "supervisors" under the
Act, finding that the lieutenants did
not exercise independent judgment
nor did they discipline and direct
subordinate employees.
The Board examined the lieuten-
ants' authority to determine whether
the position fell within the supervisor
exclusion.  Section 3(r) of the IPLRA
defines a supervisor as an employee
"who has authority, in the interest of
the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, direct, reward, or discipline
employees, or to adjust their griev-
ances, or to effectively recommend
such action, if the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the
consistent use of independent judg-
ment."
treatment division did not exercise
independent judgment in hiring,  It
also found that his other arguably
supervisory activities were not per-
formed with independent judgment or
were not accomplished based on his
effective recommendation.  Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that the
supervisor of the waste water
treatment division was not a statutory
supervisor.
Finally, the court observed that
the supervisor of the streets and
cemeteries division did hire employees
without further oversight. The indi-
vidual testified that he spent about
half of his workday performing the
same tasks as his subordinates.  The
court concluded that the city failed to
prove that he spent more than half of
his workdays exercising supervisory
authority.  Consequently, the court
held that the supervisor of the streets
and cemeteries division also was not a
statutory supervisor.
In Illinois Dept of Central Mgmt.
Svcs. (State Police) v. ILRB,  382 Ill.
App. 3d 208. 888 N.E.2d 562 (4th Dist.
2008), the Fourth District Appellate
Court upheld the ILRB State Panel's
determination that telecommunica-
tions supervisors within the Illinois
State Police were not supervisors
within the meaning of the IPLRA.  The
telecommunications supervisors were
in charge of each of the department's
nine call centers located throughout
the state.  Also located in the call
centers were lead call-takers and call-
takers, who all reported to the
telecommunications supervisor.
The court observed that the
telecommunication supervisors en-
gaged in supervisory activities such as
directing their subordinates, partici-
pating in disciplinary actions and
conducting performance evaluations.
Consequently, their duties were
obviously and visibly different from
those of call-takers, who primarily
operated the dispatch consoles.  How-
ever, the telecommunications supervi-
sors also oversaw the lead call-takers.
The court characterized the lead call-
takers as occupying a "gray zone
between call-takers and telecommuni-
cations supervisors."  They functioned
as supervisors when the telecommuni-
cation supervisors were not present
and usually were assigned to different
shifts from the telecommunications
supervisors to provide supervisory
coverage. However, they also an-
swered the radio and performed other
duties of a call-taker.  The court found
the record unclear as to whether their
call-taker duties or their supervisory
duties were more important.  It
concluded that the employer had failed
to prove that the duties of the
telecommunication supervisors were
visibly and obviously different from
those of the lead call-takers who were
subordinate to them.
The court observed that telecom-
munications supervisors did conduct
performance appraisals on their
subordinates.  However, the court
found the evidence failed to indicate
that the appraisals involved the
exercise of judgment rather than
quantitative computations in various
categories. Furthermore, although
the appraisals theoretically could
impact promotions, in practice promo-
employees.  On the other hand, the
court observed that the duties of the
supervisor of the waste water
treatment plant and the supervisor of
the streets and cemeteries division
included assigning duties, purchasing
equipment, completing paperwork
and making phone calls, and thus
were obviously and visibly different
from the duties of their subordinates.
The court observed that although
the supervisor of the waste water
treatment division was involved in
hiring employees, the evidence indi-
cated that the city engineer indepen-
dently reviewed the candidates before
they were hired.  The court concluded
that the supervisor of the waste water
11
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The Board agreed with the ALJ in
regards to the lieutenants' authority
to adjust grievances and to make
recommendations for subordinates,
which included sergeants and patrol
officers.  Since lieutenants only had
authority to dismiss rather than grant
grievances by subordinates, the
lieutenants did not have to choose
between two or more significant
courses of action, and therefore, did
not use independent judgment.  Like-
wise, because the lieutenants' ability
to make recommendations was limited
to non-tangible rewards, like paper
awards and commendations, this
authority did not make the lieutenants
"supervisors" within the meaning of
the act.
However, the Board disagreed with
the ALJ in respect to the lieutenants'
ability to discipline and direct
subordinates.  The Board found that
lieutenants had the authority to
initiate discipline proceedings for
subordinates, to review discipline
issued by sergeants, and to approve or
disapprove the sergeants' disciplinary
recommendations.  Because of these
findings, the Board reversed the ALJ
recommendation that the Board
certify a bargaining unit including
lieutenants. Chairman Gallagher
dissented from the decision of
Members Anderson and Sadlowski,
arguing that  the evidence showed that
lieutenants had to confer with higher
ranking officers before finalizing
disciplinary decisions, thus, weaken-
ing the theory that lieutenants





In Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of
Agriculture, 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008),
the Supreme Court considered whether
the "class-of-one" theory of equal
protection applies in the public sector
employment context.  The Court held
that it does not.
Engquist was hired as an interna-
tional food standard specialist in 1992.
During her employment, Engquist
had conflicts with Hyatt, one of her
coworkers.  Engquist's then supervi-
sor, Corristan, responded to the
situation by forcing Hyatt to attend
diversity and anger management
training.  In 2001, Szczepanski, an
assistant director, assumed control of
Engquist's department and was heard
telling a client that he could not
"control" Engquist and that she and
Corristan "would be gotten rid of."
Thereafter, a managerial post opened
up for which both Engquist and Hyatt
applied.  Szczepanski selected Hyatt
for the position despite Engquist's
more extensive experience in the
relevant field.  Later, Engquist's
original position was eliminated
allegedly due to reorganization.  She
was putatively unqualified for the only
other position at her level and was
unwilling to take a demotion.
Consequently, she was effectively laid
off.
Engquist then filed suit in federal
district court alleging various statu-
tory and constitutional violations,
only one of which was relevant to this
case.  Specifically, Engquist alleged
that she was terminated for "arbi-
trary, vindictive, and malicious
reasons" in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, a claim which
placed Engquist in a "class-of-one."
She argued that public employers
cannot irrationally treat one employee
differently from others similarly
situated consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause irrespective of
whether such an employee is a
member of a protected class.
In rejecting Enquist's contentions,
the Court acknowledged its holding in
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528
U.S. 562 (2000), allowing a class-of-
one equal protection claim against a
municipality for disparate treatment
concerning the zoning regulations.
The Court distinguished Olech, noting
that there is an important distinction
between government acting on the one
hand as a sovereign and on the other as
an employer.  The government has
greater authority acting as an
employer than acting as a sovereign,
i.e. as a lawmaker or regulator.  While
a public employee retains his or her
constitutional rights upon accepting a
governmental position, these rights
must be balanced against the "realities
of the employment context."  In
striking this balance, the basic
concerns of the relevant constitutional
provision and whether those concerns
may give way to the requirements of a
government employer must be consid-
ered.  Here, the balance favors public
employers because "employment deci-
sions are quite often subjective and
individualized, resting on a wide array
of factors that are difficult to articulate
and quantify."  Personality conflicts,
for instance, may justify an employ-
ment decision while being wholly
inappropriate as a basis for "arm's-
length" government action in a
legislative or regulatory context.  In
short, recognizing the class-of-one
theory in the public employment
context would "constitutionalize the
employee grievance" and would run
counter to the basic at-will employ-
ment doctrine.
Justice Stevens, writing for three
dissenters, asserted that there was no
compelling reason to carve, with a
"meat-axe," arbitrary public employ-
ment decisions out of the well-
established category of equal protec-
tion violations when the rational
review standard could sufficiently
limit such claims to only wholly
unjustified employment actions.
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